A deck of cards can be used as a cryptographic tool ([3], [6] ). Using a protocol that securely computes the Boolean AND function, one can construct a protocol for securely computing any Boolean function. This, in turn, can be used for secure multiparty computations, solitary games, zero knowledge proofs and other cryptographic schemes.
is committed to % , she will never know what bit & was committed to). Bert den Boer [4] first introduced a now classic protocol that enables two participants to privately compute the AND function of their inputs. To be able to compute any Boolean function (see section 6) it is necessary that the answer be in a committed format. Claude Crépeau and Joe Kilian came up with a solution to this problem in [3] , using 4 types of cards. Later on, Valtteri Niemi and Ari Renvall proposed a solution in [6] that used only 2 types of cards. Although our solution is only linearly more efficient than the latter one (which in turn, is only linearly more efficient than the one in [3] ), it proves important upper bounds and may be the most simple and efficient one that exists. A protocol for securely computing the Boolean AND function is an important cryptographic tool with many applications, it can be used for multiparty computations, solitary games, zero-knowledge proofs and more (we discuss these later on, see also [4] , [3] , [1] , [6] ). Although the number of cards needed for the computation of a Boolean function increases only linearly with the number of gates of the circuit defining it, complex computations demand an extremely large amount of cards. Only small computations of these kind can be done efficiently with cards, thus even slight optimizations of the AND protocol is useful.
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will denote the operator that takes an element from the set 4 Secure AND protocol [4] first proposed a protocol to securely compute s t but the result was not in a committed format. Claude Crépeau and Joe Kilian proposed a Las Vegas algorithm in [3] that produced a committed output but it uses a larger alphabet (a deck of u different types of cards), needs to make copies of the cards that commit the input and takes an average of [3] . It also gives an upper bound to the number of copies needed of the inputs: NO copies of the inputs need to be made. Our protocol works as follows: Denote y 7 y 6
as the cards that commit have no information on the order of the cards and the act of turning the topmost card becomes equivalent to picking, uniformly at random, a card from the deck. Now, after the cyclic shuffling, the probability that the 2 topmost cards are is also equiprobable in all four cases. These are all the situations we will encounter, all probabilities are equiprobable in all four cases, thus demonstrating that our protocol is secure.
The fact that the protocol gives the commitment to the right answer can easily be seen by observing the value coded by the cards to be picked by the protocol.
Other primitives
In order to be able to privately compute any probabilistic Boolean function we first need to describe a few more primitives.
OR, NOT gates
It is easy to compute the negation of a committed bit, you simply reverse the order of the two cards. With this in hand, and the AND protocol described in section 4, we can easily construct a protocol for the OR gate ( w v w © y x { z | } } z | ).
Random committed bits
For a probabilistic Boolean function, we can get random bits by taking cards committing bits and applying R q SU to them.
Copies of a committed bit
Although copies of the committed bits are not need to compute a simple boolean gate, it is a tool that is needed for privately computing any Boolean function. We present a protocol that enables us to make~copies of a committed bit, for any~. The protocol comes directly from [3] To copy a committed bit : 
Computations with cards

Multi-Party Computations
The notion of multiparty computation (MPC) was first introduced in [7] . A first protocol permitting a general multiparty computation, as well as completeness theorems, was given in [5] . The MPC problem can be defined as follows: a group of~players 6 3 $ 9 @ 9 $ 9 s B wish to securely (and correctly) compute C y 6 3 $ 9 @ 9 $ 9 Q 3 y B D
, where y is ' s private input and is a public function which they have agreed upon. Securely here means that a player does not get to know any more information than what he can deduce from his own input and the result of the function. We assume here that the participants always follow the protocol, in an other case a more specific definition of security must be provided (see [5] and [2] for example). Also, if a group of participants decide to collide together, they must form a minority of the total number of participants.
As mentioned in [3] and [6] , we can use the tools presented here to enable multiparty computations of any Boolean function. We simply publicly describe a Boolean circuit (AND, OR and NOT gates) defining the function and, using protocols described above, securely compute each gate, keeping the answers in committed format and using them for other inputs when necessary. The inputs of the participants are of course introduced in a committed format. Only the final answer of the function is revealed. Probabilistic Boolean functions can also be securely computed using the protocol described to generate random committed bits. 
Perfect Zero Knowledge Proofs
Solitary Games
As discussed in [3] , any game can be played solitarily by describing the strategies of one's opponents in a probabilistic boolean circuit. POKER and BRIDGE are such examples. To play in solitary one discreetly applies the strategies of the opponents by using the secure protocols described above.
Remarks and Open Questions
1. We assumed that cyclic permutations (cyclic shufflings) of a deck of cards are indistinguishable. A question that remains open is if there are more general primitives that may allow us to do the same computations as discussed in this paper (for example, [6] suggested to try moving from a cyclic symmetry group to a dihedral group).
2. A proof that the result presented in this paper, working in cyclic groups, is optimal concerning the amount of cards that need to be used would be good. We have started such proofs under certain conditions (no copying, 2 types of cards, using the commitment scheme described in this paper), but a more generalized proof would be better.
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